I. Introduction

The “lost decades” of the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America and the Caribbean were on the whole disappointing ones in terms of solutions to social problems related to poverty and inequality, despite significant advances in terms of political democratization and, in a number of cases, steady economic growth (Campos, 2000; Gafar 1997, 1998). The apparently intractable inequalities in the region again pose a number of questions once thought to be definitively answered by an earlier generation of scholars who were largely influenced by simpler political horizons. According to Morse (1993), Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s entered a period of acquiescence and tacit acceptance of the “permanent marginality” of many of its citizens. This literature review addresses the broad theme of the shift in social scientific, and particularly sociological, discourse on inequality in the region as it traces recent approaches to the problem. With changes in intellectual trends and the decline in the near-hegemony of dependency theory as an explanatory paradigm, scholars have begun to address the problem in new and multifaceted ways, in a period when inequality not only persisted but when “new inequalities” manifested themselves despite the many democratic transitions in the area.

While it appears that for the moment no other competing intellectual paradigm is likely to occupy the earlier position of dependency theory as a meta-explanation for inequalities, the scholarship has multiplied in terms of approaches, analytic focus, and modes of explanation toward inequality. This review essay considers three principal aspects of this new and vast scholarship, considering two new dimensions of inequality (racial inequality and urban inequality) and one new mechanism for the reproduction of inequality (culture) that together have captured the imagination of many social scientists. As will be clear
throughout the review below, these are not completely discrete categories, but they do form enough of a coherent analytic focus to justify the grouping. As will also be clear, the relationship of different authors to earlier dependency arguments is varied and more or less sympathetic, and in some cases turning to explanations anathema to dependency arguments, such as arguments related to culture. A common theme to much of the new literature that I explore in the review is the insistent attention to the specificity of subnational and local contexts and institutions and the perceived inadequacy of purely national units of analysis.

After a very brief review of older approaches to inequality in the region, the paper turns to the three substantive areas. The first aspect the paper addresses is the “new” attention to racial and ethnic inequalities, and the ways in which it reproduces itself, particularly as articulated to economic and gender inequalities. Not only has the fact of racial and ethnic inequality been raised as a dimension of inequality worthy of analysis unto itself, but new research has focused on the myriad ways in which it has been reproduced, particularly in contexts in which dominant representations are of racial harmony. The paper then turns to a “new face of inequality” in Latin America and the Caribbean, the new patterns of urban social exclusion, including new patterns of urban segregation, violence, with attention to how these reproduce, and some times accentuate, social inequalities. The final substantive part of the paper addresses the research on culture and citizenship. While a much earlier generation of scholarship pronounced Latin American and Caribbean countries more prone to inequality by virtue of conservative political cultures, the new scholarship has paid more nuanced attention to representations of citizenship and subcitizenship as well as political practices, such as clientelism and patronage schemes at the level of neighborhoods,
that reproduce inequality. The paper then offers some tentative conclusions on directions for research inspired by these new approaches.

II. After Dependency

Dependency theories and their variants have been well-described and criticized in the literature, as have the intellectual history of the rise and wane of its influence on Latin American and Caribbean scholarship, making a review here redundant. Nonetheless, for the purposes of the current review it is worth mentioning the fact that Dependency arguments, by and large, privileged “external” explanations to internal outcomes, privileged class stratification over other axes of inequality, and largely relied on national units of analysis.

As is known, most dependency scholars argued that because of the external ties of Third World nations that made them dependent on Industrialized nations for inputs, capital, advanced technology, and know-how, these nations would remain in a state of underdevelopment, or “stunted” economic and social growth. This state would be marked by high poverty, continued dependence on international finance, and an export-oriented economy based on cash crops or basic manufactured goods. Local elites tied to international capital, such as large land-owners, benefited from this process and wielded strong influence over local government to facilitate it. Scholars such as Paul Baran, Andre Gunther Frank, Theotonio dos Santos, Cardoso & Faletto, and Samir Amin, also pointed to the negative impacts of dependent industrialization, such as the high inequality between workers linked to foreign-owned industries and those in traditional sectors of the economy. There was a great deal of variance in the literature about the role of the state and local actors and how pre-determined the future of the continent was.

This broad theoretical starting point provided inspiration for a number of works on the various facets of inequality in the continent, which all in some way privileged the
explanations and modes of analysis of Dependency: the privileging of external factors and of national units. Whether from the perspective of the ‘dependent city’, (Castells, 1977; Roberts, 1978), or more recent perspectives of ‘urbanization in the world-economy.’ (Gilbert and Gugler, 1982), scholars have pointed to the way in which ‘third world’ cities have followed an urbanization process that is a function of a peripheral location within the global capitalist system of accumulation. Gilbert & Gugler’s (1982) starting point for analysis is typical of these works:

[F]orms of urban development in the third world can be understood only as an outcome of the historical process of expansion by capitalist powers. At the same time the effect of that expansion cannot be understood except in terms of the nature of raw-material production and the forms of the indigenous societies that were incorporated. (Gilbert and Gugler, 1982:18)

Typical studies made connections between the conditioning factors on urban process, such as peripheral industrialization, and outcomes on the urban form, as large ‘marginal’ sections in the city. In contrast to Modernization studies which focused on the ‘bright lights’ effects which caused peasants to migrate to cities, for instance, these researchers looked instead to external conditioning factors of the specific type of urbanization. Bradshaw (1985) for instance, in a cross national study, found that ‘overurbanized’ cities in Latin America and the Caribbean were found to be associated with the specific form of capitalist penetration and industrialization of their hinterlands. Manuel Castells (1977) argued that “dependency” expressed itself in “the internal organization of societies in question, and more concretely in the articulation of the system of production and class relations.” In urban contexts this meant that in Latin American cities one might expect: 1. A disproportionate population growth for the level of development, with a numerous reserve army of labor that is otherwise employed in the tertiary sector. 2. An ecological imbalance in the system of cities 3. A cultural
distance between town and country. (1977:42; 1975:19) This was, according to Castells, the reflection “at the level of space of the asymmetrical relations of core and periphery countries.” (1977:43)

Similarly, scholars such as Rodney (1981) or Stevenhagen (1965) linked dependent relationships between First and Third World nations to patterns of racial exploitation and domination in those nations. Stevenhagen’s “internal colonialism” model, for instance, explained national patterns of racial inequality in Mexico as one link in a chain of colonial domination, in which non-white populations formed an internal nation within a nation within an international system of asymmetrical relations. Rodney explained racism in the Caribbean as a reflection of imperialism practiced by local elites imbued with foreign ideologies.

_Beyond Imperialism: Relational Theories of Inequality_

The shift away from the dominance of dependency explanations had a number of political causes, such as the disappointment with national liberation projects upon which some analyses had been predicated, but had also to do with the limits of these explanations. In time, the focus on national units of analysis became more limiting than illuminating to explain variations within countries, just as the emphasis on “external” factors proved inadequate and obscured important local-level explanations.

As I have suggested earlier, a ‘relational’ approach to inequality, broadly conceived, has supplanted Dependency and neo-Marxist approaches as a theoretical standpoint from which to examine inequality in the Region. Inspired by the sociology of practice of Bourdieu, Boltanski, Giddens, and others, such approaches point us to the importance of setting-specific values attached to attributes and competences that are unequally distributed in
the population. To use the language of ‘fields and capitals’ of Bourdieu, specific settings are defined by the rules of what counts in it, or how much different attributes are ‘worth’:

In fact, what is determinant in a given area is a particular configuration of the system of properties constituting the constructed class, defined in an entirely theoretical way by the whole set of factors operating within it – volume and structure of capital, sex, age, marital status, place of residence etc. It is the specific logic of the field, of what is at stake and of the type of capital needed to play for it, which governs those properties through which the relationship between class and practice is established. (Bourdieu 1984: 113)

While a neo-Marxist or Dependency approach might lend analytical primacy to class or economic relations in explaining inequality, such an approach might not be adequate to explain the variety of other axes of inequality that are empirically significant. Instead of attempting to functionally link racial inequalities to the logic of class inequality, or attempting to “explain” gender or ethnicity, relational approaches attempt to understand the setting-specific “value” of certain attributes and practices associated with social positions. Certain settings, such as a specific employment sector, have very specific attributes attached to it as desirable and “count” in different ways. Phenotype, for instance, may be more of a factor in discrimination in the service sector than in manual labor in Latin America. But in each setting practices and competences “count” differently as well. These practices – which include ways of seeing the world and structured ways of acting – are associated with social position and individual’s trajectories. Individuals “carry” with them these practices, which again, “count” differently in various settings. To return to the example of the service sector, an individual’s accent that betrays an ethnic background may count negatively and cause the individual to be discriminated against regardless of phenotype. These practices also shape individual’s preferences and perceptions and relational sociologists attempt to understand how these practices reproduce social inequalities over time.
The Perceptions of Inequality.

Important to the new approaches is an appreciation of how perceptions of inequality themselves are part of the way that inequality is reproduced, and not just a sort of “false consciousness” as had been described in the earlier literature. As Rex writes,

a belief system is used to justify a particular stratification situation, the situation is itself changed thereby and the belief system may set in motion wholly new social processes. (Rex, 1970:51 cited in de la Fuente 1998:46)

In the context of Latin America and the Caribbean this belief system has been particularly strong in presenting an image of equality and integration vis-à-vis racial and ethnic communities. This “homogenization from above” (Rojas Ortuste, 1989) reflected elite-generated ideologies that Latin American countries were by-and-large already “post-racial” united under a mestizo national community (Graham, 1990). Scholars like Skidmore (1967) have argued that ideologies of integration emerged as a next best solution for white elites, who unable to “whiten” population through European migration, settled for ideologies of mixing that supported white supremacy.

III. Racial Inequalities in the Lands of Democracy

A relatively new dimension to the study of inequality in the Latin American and the Caribbean. While earlier works, such as by CLR James, FH Cardoso addressed racial inequality historically, much of the social scientific treatment of race relations in Latin America and the Caribbean has been to treat racial inequality as either the result of an incomplete process of national integration, or as an expression of class inequalities. New approaches have tended to treat racial inequalities as “relatively autonomous” but related to social class.
Until the 1970s many scholars defended the position that Latin American and Caribbean societies were more integrated under national projects in ways that distinguished them, and made them more racially tolerant, than the United States with its history of legalized segregation (Arocha, 1998; Pitt Rivers, 1973). Recent scholarship has shown how mestizaje, “affirmed racial mixing, [while] it maintained white superiority. (Safa, 1998:5)”

The ideology of mestizaje supports white superiority, partially, by enforcing a silence on race relations and by creating the perception of integration. Many Latin American countries had official policies that stated that they were already fully integrated and did not collect data or use language to suggest that racial groups existed in those countries, despite blatant lived levels of inequality between racial groups. In Cuba, talk of race and racial inequality was considered divisive and corrosive of the national project, which historically relied on “a conscious and selective silence about race (de la Fuente, 1998: 44).” In Colombia, for instance, Afro-Colombians were officially relegated to invisible status, while native populations were officially treated as “savages” to be civilized until the 1991 constitution (Arocha, 1998). Other national projects, such as in Bolivia, “redefined” Indians as peasants, erasing their claims. By making non-white racial groups largely “invisible” and by not permitting discussion of race, the mobilization of black and indigenous groups has been much less pronounced. Much of the distinctiveness of Latin American and Caribbean race relations comes from the strength of the imagery of integration and mixing as accepted descriptions of social life in these countries. Brazil has been described as having “racism without ethnicity” so strong is the imagery of integration (Sansone, 1998). In the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, for instance, national linguistic identities that cross racial and class lines
are much stronger than separate racial identities, despite clear patterns of social stratification and a valorization of white phenotypes. (Mintz, 1974)

**Defining Racial and Ethnic Inequalities**

Much of the new work on racial and ethnic inequalities draws upon North American theorization of race and ethnicity and it is worth offering a set of definitions. Sociologists generally treat both race and ethnicity as social constructions with no necessary bases in genetics or any inherent group characteristics. Both vary from time to time and from place to place, and the same groups of people may be differently classified over time. Both race and ethnicity are group definitions that define collectives of people as belonging to (and others excluded from) certain categories based on socially understood markers, such as phenotype, language, and dress. The difference that is generally drawn between the two is that race and racial groups imply attributed genetic (and therefore, “biological” and immutable) origins and always imply subordinate-superordinate group relations. Ethnicity does not imply attributed genetic difference and only cultural differences, and does not always imply subordination.

In the case of the United States, for instance, non-white racial identity is defined by the “one-drop rule” (hypodescent) that is contrasted to a different model in Latin America and the Caribbean:

A person with African ancestry is categorized as a member of the African American racial group and thereby excluded from the definition of whiteness fundamental to US racial identity. This model of racial construction has made race a fundamental division in US society and encouraged the formation among African Americans of a separate racial identity that is often lacking in Latin America and the Caribbean (Safa, 1998:4).

The literature on Latin America and the Caribbean has pointed to varying levels of importance of ethnicity and its interaction with racial structures. Some countries, like Brazil
and the Spanish speaking Caribbean have been described as ethnicity being relatively less important than racial distinctions. On the whole, however, scholars have started to argue that despite ideologies of integration, relations between dominant elites and ethnic indigenous groups are best understood as racial discrimination (Castellanos Guerrero, 2000; Casaus Arzu, 2000; Perez Ruiz, 2000). In a review essay, Petrinos (2000) documents the various “costs” (as in lower returns to investments in education) associated with belonging to indigenous groups throughout Latin America.

However, while racial categories have been imposed “from the outside” by dominant groups, this has not precluded subordinate groups from developing ethnic self-understanding and identities, which in some contexts has served as an important resource (Canessa, 1998). Wade (1993), in reference to Colombia, describes the way that Black immigrants from the Chocó region are treated as particularly “backwards” by other groups of migrants, and maintain distinctive networks as means of survival; similar patterns have been described for Bolivia (Gregor, 1993; Templeman, 1991) and Guatemala (Camus, 1999; Thomson, 2002). While some scholars have documented the impact of ethnic differences on such practices as child-rearing (Apetkar, 1993; Wilson and Wilson, 1998), beliefs in traditional healing systems and use of allopathic medicine (Guevara Corral 1996; Glei and Goldman, 2000), family structure (Menguez Dominguez 1996), gender division of labor at home (Nettles, 1995) systematic evidence of such patterns and their relationships to structured inequality still does not exist for Latin American and the Caribbean as a whole. Of course, since scholars have documented the importance of participation in mutual assistance and kinship networks as a way to buffer the impact of economic changes (de la Rocha and Gantt, 1995), an important consideration might be whether ethnic groups vary in terms of their access to these,
or whether ethnic identification grants access to networks that may buffer the impact of inequality.

The literature points to the importance of ethnic re-awakening in Latin America and the Caribbean, with reassertion of ethnic and racial identities among subordinate groups. In the United States, the reawakening of Native American identity caused difficulties in enumerating indigenous groups. Throughout Latin America there has been growing recognition of the plight of native populations as result of international and local pressure (Banton, 1996; Ortiz, 1984). In Guatemala there is currently a revival of Mayan identity (Arriza and Arrias, 1998; del Cid Avalos, 1998; Garcia Ruiz, 1992), while in Brazil the re-emergence of the organized Black Movement has been significant in the country’s democracy (Andrews, 1991)

Guatemala, Bolívia, and Guyana: Some Evidence

Traditional scholarship on Guatemala has argued for the Ladinization thesis – that is, that indigenous groups were gradually losing their ethnic identity, a finding that has been challenged of late (Adams, 1993). Recently, scholars have convincingly argued that the discrimination of indigenous and mestizo groups is on racial grounds. Casaus Arzu (2000) argues, based on a survey of elite respondents, that elites hold racist ideas based on attributed racial inferiority of indigenous groups and use skin color as a primary marker to separate themselves from non-whites. In recent years, the revival of Mayan identity as a “chosen” politicized identity has been described (Garcia Ruiz, 1992).

For Guatemala, Camus (1999) has documented patterns of urban separation where a trading area of Guatemala City (“La Terminal”) is considered an important place for indigenous groups. Camus notes that there are distinctive ethnic orientations among groups,
and she distinguishes visiting tradesmen (who retain the most ethnicity), natives of the city (who are in risk of “losing” Indian culture) and immigrants, who deploy ethnicity to resist marginalization. This challenges earlier work by Swetnam (1979) who argues that ethnic identity is less important than class factors in predicting success of vendors. Odell (1984) has discussed the way that migration impacts and transforms indigenous ethnicity, while Britnall (1980) argued that as result of migratory changes and the entrance of indigenous groups into the labor force, Ladino and Indigenous groups were becoming increasingly competitive. Perez Sains et al (1993) have studied precisely the impact of ethnicity on labor market trajectories in Guatemala. Using data from an employment survey, they show that self-employment is predominant among indigenous urban groups, supporting the finding that indigenous identities are maintained and that family networks are the main way of obtaining employment, challenging the notion that they experience urban integration. Menguez Domingo (1983) has documented differences in family structure among traditional indigenous, modified indigenous, Ladino, and urban groups, finding that more traditional groups are likely to rely on broader, less nuclear, family networks.

In Bolívia, a similar model of national integration has been deployed, with elites generally resisting the claims of indigenous groups (Canessa, 1998). Kelley (1988) documents that based on an ethnographic questionnaire in rural Bolivia that inequalities between indigenous populations and whites and mestizos are stark, even when controlling for family income and levels of education. Despite the same levels of education being given to sons in comparable families, systematic discrimination over time prevents indigenous individuals from receiving similar returns to education. Perez Ruiz (2000) has described the daily discrimination that Indians face in urban settings and the role that the stereotype of the
cholo is used to perpetuate patterns of segregation. Van Lidert (1991) has described the different fates of indigenous migrants to that of other migrants in La Paz. Gregor (1993) and Modovi (1993), on the other hand, have both shown through ethnographic work that urban Aymara Indians deploy ethnic resources as a way to survive discrimination and marginalization, while Templeman (1991) discusses the way afro-bolivians have mobilized through the use of cultural symbols.

The English-speaking Caribbean is distinctive from the rest of the Caribbean and from Latin America in terms of the relative strength of ethnic identities (Safa, 1998). Racial lines were more starkly drawn under colonial rule, and white elites did not develop nationalist ideologies of integration and racial mixing, and a stronger sense of subordinate racial identities was developed over time. In the post-independence period, the departure of colonial elites left black and East Indian emergent elites to compete for power in Trinidad and Guyana (Safa, 1998). Gomes (1984) has documented the role of these competing elites in the post-independence power struggles. While Coppin (1997) has documented a significant pattern of racial stratification in terms of income in Trinidad and Tobago (Black women earn 81 cents for every dollar earned by mixed-race women, for instance), a pattern which might be expected to hold in Guyana, Mathews and Wilson (1999) have also found, however, that for Guyana, there is evidence for growing ethnic tolerance particularly among urban educated sectors. Haynes (1982) has described the preference of urban Guyanese for more proper English. While Nettles (1995) has documented differences in the gender division of labor between East Indian and black households, with East Indian women shouldering much more of the responsibilities.
Case Study: Changing Terms on Race Relations in Brazil

Brazil has long been considered an important test case for discussions of racial integration and multiculturalism and has continued to provide fodder for academic discussions about the nature of its racial structures (Andrews, 1991; Hasenbalg, 1979; Motta, 2000; Lovell, 1991; Skidmore, 1967; Harris, 1964; Degler, 1971; Silva, 2001). Motta (2000) describes three paradigms in the study of race relations in Brazil – morenidade, the integrationist approach that describes the country as a relatively harmonious “melting pot”, a class centered approach that saw race as residual category after class inequality, and a new approach that points to racial discrimination in itself as a cause of economic inequality. Motta’s first and second approaches here fall into what I have called the “national” approach to inequality, and the third approach represents the newer scholarship.

Brazil’s race relations have long been of interest to scholars in and outside of Brazil. As a country with a racially mixed population but without ever having legal patterns of discrimination, Brazil has long been hailed a “racial democracy.” Thomas Skidmore (1974) also suggests that Brazilian ‘elites’ had uneasy relationship with racialist theories as a result of being torn between the consumption of European racial theories and the reality of a multi-racial country at home. Abolitionist Joaquim Nabuco, for instance, favored white European immigration to improve the ‘national race’. But since the 1920s, and the full development of Brazilian nationalist thought, the period saw Brazilian thinkers reflecting on the racial question in search of a uniquely Brazilian solution to its problems. Miscegenation, integration and assimilation would form the basis for the ‘Brazilian’ approach to its race question. During the 1930s ‘racial democracy’ became entrenched as an official ideology, with its ‘tenets’ being that there was ‘no racial problem in Brazil’ and that ‘racial
discrimination was un-Brazilian' would from then on become part of a common sense that Brazilians were a ‘people without prejudice.’ (Hasenbalg, 1979:242). The racial democracy thesis had a number of additional principles: Brazil lacked “pure races”; “racial identification” was largely a matter of individual choice, there is possible “racial mobility” for most nonwhite Brazilians, and “apparent” patterns of racial segregation and inequality were only the effect of class inequalities.

Scholarship on race relations followed these “insights” for many years. Gilberto Freyre declared originally in the 1930s, in *The Masters and Slaves*, that

> It was religion that became the point of contact and of fraternization between the two cultures, that of the Master and of the slave, and there was never any stern and insurmountable barrier between them (cited in Motta, 2000: 666).

Marvin Harris in his ethnographic work in the late 1950s and early 1960s agreed with much of what the “racial democracy” arguments would have predicted (Harris, 1964). He writes, for example, that “racial mobility” was a reality in Brazil:

> In Brazil one can pass to another racial category regardless of how dark one may be without changing one’s residence. […] Brazilians say “money whitens”, meaning that the richer a dark man gets the lighter will be the racial category to which he will be assigned by his friends, relatives and business associates (cited in Motta, 2000:667).

Carl Degler’s (1971) influential work, in the same vein, argues that Brazil’s social structure is not determined in any significant way by racial identities. The presumed relatively harmonious slaveholding past, coupled with a catholic heritage led to a high degree of miscegenation that created a large mixed *Moreno* population therefore preventing racial antagonisms. For Degler and Harris (as well as Freyre), the ambiguity of race relations in Brazil and the preponderance of a large mixed population beyond simple classification of “black” or “white” means that racial identities are not important in the determination of the country’s social structure.
A first challenge to the *morenidade* approach came from Florestan Fernandes in the 1970s, who argued, essentially, that while earlier approaches were incorrect in denying the importance of racial inequality, these patterns of racial inequality were just expressions of class inequality, and in particular, the inability of black Brazilians to integrate into a modern, capitalist society. Remnants of racial prejudice do exist in Brazil, but they are in fact remnants of class prejudice resulting from Brazil’s distorted development, and would presumably disappear with subsequent industrial growth and development (Fernandes, 1979).

Subsequent scholars have challenged these two interpretations, whether from a historical perspective (Dzidzienyo, 1971; Moura 1988; Marx, 1998) or in the basis of aggregate (Hasenbalg, 1979; Lovell and Wood, 1998; Lovell 1999) or ethnographic (Twine, 1998) evidence. All these scholars in some way or another deal with the apparent paradox of “pacific racialism” (the lack of open racial hostility, the lack of a legal history of discrimination, the perception of no racial discrimination) with the harsh reality of very high indices of racial inequality. Hasenbalg, for instance, points to the influx of white migrants to Brazil in the period between the wars as preventing the formation of a split labor market and allowing ‘whitening’ of the industrial centers of São Paulo and Rio. This is, for him, how Brazil’s particular brand of racialism would be conciliated and remain ‘smooth’ and free of conflict. The construction of whiteness and other racial categories in Brazil was very different than in other places, as the United States. For one thing, it was constructed in relation to more ‘pure bred’ versions in Europe and in the United States. Also, Blackness did not become the ‘symbolic touchstone’ in the same way as it did in post-abolition United States, as several ‘in between’ gradations between black and white were conceptualized, and
whiteness would, as a result, become a somewhat, though not completely, porous (Marx, 1998).

Another important point is that discrimination in Brazil may be more subtle. As Hasenbalg writes,

Due to the results of subtle discriminative practices and of other, more general, racist mechanisms, non-whites have educational opportunities that are more limited than those of whites of the same social origin. On the other hand the educational achievements of blacks and mulattos are translated into occupational and income gains proportionally smaller than those of whites (Hasenbalg, 1979:221. Cited in Motta 2000:675)

Scholars have therefore cautioned against the indiscriminate use of indices utilized in (mostly) North American studies separate from more substantial interpretations of inequality. Hasenbalg’s aggregate data does not speak to what these “discriminative practices” might be, but other scholars have attempted to fill in this gap. A clear example of the potential lack of meaning of these approaches that fetishize indices of segregation are the patterns of segregation in Brazil. Brazilian blacks on the whole have many more apparent racial contacts than United States blacks (Telles 1992; Telles 1995a; Telles 1995b), but as other scholars have noted, are much worse off in terms of income differences and labor market position, child mortality, life expectancy among other indicators (Lovell 1999). Whereas in the United States racial contacts are taken as a measure of substantive racial integration, The Brazilian case shows that high racial contacts are compatible with substantial inequalities.

Scholars have “filled in” the details of how racial discrimination works largely through ethnographic work and new analyses of quantitative data. Twine’s ethnographic work (1998) describes the maintenance of “white supremacy” in Brazil, discussing the way the perception of racial mobility – that is, the perception that blacks may “move up” the racial
ladder perpetuates racial inequality by preventing black Brazilians from making claims to protest discrimination. Silva and Hasenbalg (2000) find that while inequality in terms of educational schooling has decreased somewhat in recent years, a significant portion of this improvement can be accounted for by demographic factors and geographical mobility, with non-whites tending to move away from the geographical regions associated with low education (principally North and Northeast). Of course, as other scholars have documented, nonwhites still face significant penalties in terms of return to education (Lovell and Wood, 1998).

IV. The City and New Inequalities

The city has been long at the center of concerns for social scientists, but recent years have seen renewed approaches, more concerned with the “newness” of inequality and with its specifically local manifestations rather than relying on national-level and world-system types of explanations alone (Clark, 2000). Attention to specifically new inequalities as well as to the impact of the restructuring of cities under “globalization” are hallmarks of the new approaches.

Scholars have pointed out that since the 1970s urban inequality and exclusion in places like Mexico City and São Paulo has been steadily increasing: the continent-wide pattern of structural adjustment programs and the continued push-off from the land throughout the 1980s contributed to the swelling of an already crowded urban periphery at a time of cutbacks of already inadequate social services. Already since the 1970s Latin American and Caribbean countries were among the most “superurbanized”: that is, presenting the greatest indices of urban primacy (Doughty, 1979). And while in the 1990s the rate of growth in mega-cities has slowed down, these changes have not improved urban scenarios and scholars have addressed the city and related phenomena in a number of
important ways, including the impact of urban restructuring (Follain, 1996; Gilbert, 1996, 1997; Rakowsky, 1999; Ciccoela, 1999) urban informality (Laguerre, 1991; Potter, 1993; Cross, 1997; Dietz 2001; Apetkar, 1988; Funkhouser, 1996; Jones, 1997), crime and parallel economies (Seetahal, 1997; Leeds, 1996), urban violence (Huggins, 2000; Pecaut, 1997; Petras, 1988; Rotker, 2001) the social networks of the poor (Espinosa, 1993; Auyero 2001; Gay 1998; Kersting, 1999; Rocha, 1995), new middle class lifestyles (Minujin, 1995; Medina Cano, 1998; Caldeira 2001), and urban fear and exclusion (Streiker, 1997; Baiocchi, 2002; Caldeira, 2001)

Scholars have extensively described the impact of economic restructuring on the cities of the region. The continued decline in public-sector spending has coupled with changes in the global economy that have exacerbated the gap between haves and have-nots everywhere, but that have played themselves out with particular effect in Latin America and the Caribbean, and as a rule, cities in the region today concentrate both its wealthiest and its poorest. And the same for other large Latin American and Caribbean cities; as changes associated with “globalization” take hold—decline in public sector spending, the liberalization of the economy, the re-structuring of traditional industrial manufacturing—the quality of life for urban-dwellers, particularly the urban have-nots, has become worse and worse (Follain, 1996; Gilbert, 1996, 1997; Rakowsky, 1999; Ciccoela, 1999). Despite variation it is possible to say that since the 1950s the region has rapidly urbanized, today roughly 70% of Latin Americans live in cities, while fifty years ago, less than a third of the population lived in urban areas at all (Singer 1977). Until the 1970s, urban populations grew most rapidly in a few major cities. Despite a relative de-concentration of growth toward medium-sized cities in the 1980s, the ability of municipalities to meet collective needs has
not improved (Gilbert 1996). The liberalization of the economy since the 1980s, and continued investment in large-scale agriculture did little to stop the flow of migrants to cities that had driven the region’s urban growth in the 1960s and 1970s. Uneven land-tenure contributed to rural exodus at a rate much higher than could be absorbed by the urban labor markets (Perz 2000).

Bogotá represents a facet of this phenomenon: while urban poverty has fallen, and urban unemployment has been brought under control since the 1970s, this has not reduced inequality. (Gilbert, 1997) Similarly, Ciccolella (1999) points to the outcomes of the patterns of economic restructuring in Buenos Aires and the push toward new social exclusions in similar terms. The reform of the state, economic deregulation, and the privatization of state owned enterprises have transformed the urban landscape.

Some of the new scholarship has focused on new urban exclusive lifestyles. While a small portion of the urban population in these cities has been able to recreate world-class luxury in urban settings like São Paulo, though they have increasingly had to enjoy this luxury from behind the confines of secluded buildings and settings. Teresa Caldeira’s study *The City of Walls* (2000) has documents this new pattern of exclusion in her study of São Paulo, with the rise in gated communities and private policing in Brazilian cities. The private security business in Brazil today is one of the fastest growing sectors of the economy, with total industry sales expected to reach $650 million in 2000, making Brazil the world's largest market armored cars (Smith 2000). Since the late 1970s fear of “encroaching urban masses” has been a dominant theme in discussions about the city, when the “fear of crime” became a problem of national proportions, as middle-class Brazilians clamored for law-and-order and increasingly aggressive police forces strove to accommodate them (Baiocchi, 2002a). But
what has made the recent period different is that while the numbers of extremely poor urban residents have continued to grow, the well-off have achieved enough purchasing power to find completely private solutions to these problems. An out-of-control police force structured during Brazil's military dictatorship combined with these continued middle and upper class calls for increasingly harsh measures have continued to reproduce Brazil's “social apartheid (Buarque 1993).”

Other studies have focused on urban violence as a specific kind of outcome of these inequalities, particularly as linked to the increasing reliance by growing segments of the urban poor on the parallel drug economy, and a number of recent studies have documented the way in which the urban poor have been involved in parallel economies (Rotker et al, 2001). Such studies have documented the extent and impact of urban violence in many settings, including in Guatemala (Andres et al. 2000; McIlwaine and Moser, 2001), Brazil (Leeds, 1996; Harvey and Carvalho, 2000), Venezuela (Marquez, 2000), Colombia (Pecaut, 1997; Petras, 1988; McIlawine and Moser, 2001; Rubio 1997). Elizabeth Leeds has documented the growing power of local-level drug-lords in shantytown areas who stand in as local benefactors and maintainers of order in the absence of an effective and accountable state. Leeds has found that virtually all favelas in Rio have a number of people involved in the parallel economy of the drug trade, with a complex division of labor employing people of all ages in the distribution of drugs (Leeds 1996). Rubio (1997) has documented the impact of social networks involved in parallel economies in Colombia, terming these “pervasive social capital.” Booth and Bayer (1996) have linked state-sponsored violence in Central America with the unwillingness to participate in political activities.
Case Study: Life in the City Streets

A number of important new studies, largely in the form of ethnographic case studies, have begun to document new patterns of urban inequality, and the complex interrelationships between violence, exclusions, and inequality. An exemplary study is Patricia Marquez’ *The Street is my Home: Youth and Violence in Caracas*. There are, by some estimates, 40 million street children in Latin America, or half of the world-wide population of homeless children (Marquez, 1999:1), a phenomenon that is distinctly urban and of growing magnitude in recent years (Apetkar, 1991). Her book examines the lives of street children in Caracas and discusses the various subcultures among them, from groups of “glue sniffers” to groups of *malandros* to many others, and the way that street children negotiate the various institutions that they confront. Of particular interest are her descriptions of the combination of factors that lead children to the street in the first place, and of state “social service” institutions that perpetuate the squalid and repressive conditions that the children face in the street. On one hand, it is the extremely precarious situations of the *barrios* that lead children to the streets rather than sudden abandonment by parents; social disintegration and lack of access to most needs push children to leave. In the streets, children face precarious forms of survival at the edge of the legality, violence, discrimination, and the criminalization of their lives by the police and state services. Of the children who then are caught by state services, most then face torture and additional forms of abuse and degradation. The cycle of inequality is then perpetuated; while Marquez does not follow the children who survive through to adult life, it is difficult to imagine effective social or economic participation after such socialization. What this type of ethnographic work highlights are both distinctive manifestations of urban inequality (social disintegration, violence, and torture) and
mechanisms of the reproduction of inequality that are often absent from other types of research.

V. Culture, Citizenship and Inequality

Do certain forms of culture promote inequality? The concern with culture, broadly conceived, as a source of inequality is not new, and mainly concerned itself with traditional forms of culture that valued inequality (therefore promoting it directly by symbolically legitimating it) or with pathological forms of culture that promoted inequality indirectly by fostering fatalism and mistrust (Sales, 1994; Fonseca, 1998; Stewart, 1998; de la Torre, 1998; Moises, 1993). While many dependency scholars outright rejected cultural explanations of many sorts, with the return of the interest in civil society, citizenship and political participation, recent scholarship has once again turned to questions of culture and political practice and their relationship to inequality. What distinguishes the new literature on culture, however, is its attempt to understand the ways in which strategies of survival tend to reproduce what appears as “authoritarian” or “clientelistic” and tends to reproduce asymmetrical relationships. Another emphasis is on “social disorganization” as influenced by social capital approaches, as a mechanism for the reproduction of inequality.

Traditional Approaches to Culture

Scholars associated with Modernization theory in its various forms proposed that certain traditional cultures tended to value ascriptive characteristics more than universal categories and therefore tended to value unequal relationships of dominance and/or patronage. For instance, such themes are found in the work of scholars like Bansfeld (1958) who proposed to have found in the culture of Southern Italy the “moral bases” of that
“backward society” in the insistence on honor, the favor, and asymmetrical relationships.

Well-known scholars from Latin America had long argued similar points. One of Brazil’s most important historians, Sergio Buarque de Holanda, for example, pointed out in 1935 that,

In these [Iberian] nations predominated, incessantly, the type of political organization artificially maintained from the exterior (...) Against the autarky of the individual and the extreme worship of personality (...) there could only be one alternative: the renunciation of this personality in view of a greater good. It is for this reason that, obedience appears as the supreme virtue among Iberian peoples. (Cited in Sales 1994: 9)

A number of scholars have followed up with these themes. Roberto da Matta (1979) describes Brazilian political culture as one that privileges relations and ties over individualism, and “collective well-being” over “individual well-being.” The cultural construction of citizenship in Brazil is predicated in part on the association “right” with “work” and “lack of work” with threat to the social order. According to this scholarship, just as common are representations of the positive evaluation of authoritarian relationships of dependence, tutelage, and clientelism as positive in the portrayal of the kind slavemaster, the paternalistic oligarch, and the fatherly dictator. This is a political culture organized around a holistic and hierarchical vision of society that internalizes conflicts, privileges personal relations and the private, and does not readily recognize free-born citizens. Latin American political culture has been variously described as patrimonial (Souza and Lamounier 1989), collectivist (Carvalho 1991), personalistic (Beale 1977), based on the favor (Sales 1994), or hindered by Catholicism (Scarpetta, 1991). These political cultures were often described as profoundly illiberal; organized around a holistic and hierarchical vision of society that internalizes conflicts, these political cultures privileged personal relations and the private, and did not readily recognize free-born citizens, and relegated to the state the role of arbitrator of social conflicts.
A second variant of the older literature on culture and inequality is the well-known set of arguments having to do with the “culture of poverty.” While not exactly faulting traditional culture per se as much as the maldaptation of peoples from traditional cultures, the “culture of poverty” refers to the values and behaviors of the poor that keep them poor from generation to generation. As Lewis wrote in *La Vida*:

> Once it comes into existence, it tends to perpetuate itself from generation to generation because of its effect on children. By the time slum children are six or seven, they have usually absorbed the basic values and attitudes of the subculture and are not psychologically geared to take full advantage of the changing conditions or increased opportunities that may occur in their lifetime (1968:188).
>
> The culture of poverty had a number of components: lack of participation by the poor in major institutions; awareness of, but not living by middle class values such as stable marriages; low levels of community organization; absence of childhood as an extended period; and feelings of marginality, helplessness, lack of ambition, and inferiority (Lewis 1968:189-192). While these arguments were originally developed in the context of the urban poor in the ‘third world’ and were vigorously contested (Eckstein 1977; Pearlman 1977), culture of poverty arguments remained influential in the 1960s and 1970s, and provided the intellectual template for much of the analyses on, particularly, urban politics and participation, as “clientelism” was seen as a reflection, or cognate of, the culture of poverty.

As a description of urban political participation had it,

> Favela leaders generally conform to expectations about the types of leaders we might find in Latin America in general. That is, they are often dramatic, personalistic, and expect others to respond in terms of basic, close human relationships. (Mounce 1977: 69)
>
> Personalism and clientelism have been described as the hallmarks of popular politics in the region. Scholars have extensively documented patterns of clientelism, favor trading and informal networks as hallmarks of local and community politics in Latin America (Cross,
1997; Auyero, 1999; Zaluar, 1984; Eckstein, 1977). These are ways of accomplishing projects in certain neighborhoods in exchange for votes, or promise of votes, or political allegiance.

According to Gay (1998) Clientelism has been held responsible for many of the ills in the region’s democracies, “it is clientelism that forges relations of dependency between masses and elites. It is clientelism that stifles popular organization and protest. And it is clientelism that reduces elections to localized disputes over the distribution of spoils (1998:7).” Similarly, Auyero(2000) describes “political clientelism as one of those simplifying images that obscure more than clarify (2000:20)” because so much is simplistically explained by it, from oligarchical domination, to lack of organization and participation.

Scholars have, in accord, moved away from approaches that posited national cultures as monolithic impediments to democracy as well as from approaches that dichotomized clientelism and democracy. Grant (2001) exemplifies new “social capital” approaches in his study of neighborhood development in Guatemala City. This approach, as is well known, posits that it is “networks of trust, tradition, and cooperation” (Putnam, 1994) that account for developmental outcomes. Whether neighborhoods or regions have social capital is highly contingent and connected to political processes, such as access to governmental decision-making. In Grant’s study, communities strategically deployed different types of ties and networks in attempting to assure improvements. In a similar vein, Moser and McIlwaine

\[\text{\footnotesize See Baiocchi (2003) for a case for that social capital may not be always endogenous to communities and may be rather, responsive to governmentally-set conditions.}\]
(1999) account for outcomes in terms of violence in low income communities in Guatemala and Colombia as result, partially of social capital.

Case Study: Re-thinking Clientelist Networks

A number of recent case studies have questioned the earlier facility with which older approaches used to distinguish between “clientelism” and “democratic participation” and which traditional political culture was used to explain phenomena as varied as populism and corruption. And while these studies often emphasized the political cooptation that these practices assured, more recently they have to point to clientelism as a rational option for assuring access to limited goods for disadvantaged groups. (Gay, 1994) As mentioned above, clientelism is a type of relationship marked by the trade of political allegiance for favors. The traditional medium for this relationship have been the neighborhood associations and the informal networks leading up to municipal government. In addition, the main conduit of these relationships are the leaders of neighborhood associations who may hold leadership for many years and foster close relationships with representatives or bureaucrats in local government. A person’s ‘leadership’ may be considered more or less effective depending on the projects brought to the neighborhood and the quality of ‘patrons’ that person may have in municipal government. It is not uncommon for these ‘brokers’ to directly campaign for candidates or to be hired as ‘consultants’ or directly in municipal government. (Diniz, 1982. Fontes, 1995). The representation of clientelism is a paternalistic and particularistic discourse that is directly opposed to a universalistic or citizenship discourse.

An exemplary approach to rethinking the impact of this political culture is provided by Auyero in Poor People’s Politics (2001). The book describes the way that the urban poor
in Argentina make use of Peronist clientelistic networks to their own advantage while actively forging Peronist identities. Rather than presenting the poor as victims of schemes by patrons, engagement in clientelistic relationships by the poor in Argentine shanty-towns is explained as a kind of constant problem-solving through personalized networks. The idea that “pressing problems can be solved through personalized political mediation and that there are good [brokers] to be had” then becomes part of the common sense of shanty-town dwellers (211). Active participation in this system of problem solving creates and recreates political identities “as much as it provides food and medicine.” These identities are constantly reinforced through ritual and material practice. Rather than presenting clientelism as the opposite of political engagement, Auyero shows how participation in these networks is deeply political. Allegiance to these ways of problem-solving create a distinct political culture and approach to politics.

VI. Conclusions
As described throughout this paper, and as discussed by many of the authors cited here, Latin American and Caribbean inequality has persisted, and in many ways worsened, in the 1980s and 1990s. The metaphors, narratives, and conceptual framework to study this persistent inequality have shifted from earlier concerns with purely “external” and class-centered accounts to new approaches that are more sensitive to place, context, and a variety of non-class mechanisms that account for inequality, and much of the new literature falls under the rubric of relational approaches. In this paper I examined new approaches to race, to urban inequalities, and to culture.

Racial inequalities in earlier approaches were often considered as epiphenomenal, as Latin American and Caribbean nations were thought to be integrated, and distinctive racial identities were thought to be either anomalous or the byproduct of other kinds of inequalities.
Recent work has challenged this view, bringing to the fore patterns of discrimination based on race, while offering a subtle distinction between racial and ethnic factors. The distinction that “race” refers to supposedly immutable origins and the definition of subordinate groups while “ethnic” refers to attributed cultural origins and cultural self-definition allows insight into how these work together to produce inequalities, but also, at times how ethnic identification provides tools for survival and challenging inequality.

In terms of approaches to urban inequality, the new literature has turned away from analytical primacy of external factors and turned to local and distinctively urban inequalities. These include urban restructuring in specific cities, with attention to a number of topics specific to urban inequality: urban informality, crime and parallel economies, urban violence, the social networks of the poor, new middle class lifestyles, and urban fear and exclusion. In terms of culture and inequality, recent approaches have moved away from understanding of national cultures as monolithic, and as part of the way that inequality is reproduced. Rather, in the new literature there are attempts to understand the ways in which strategies of survival tend to reproduce what appears as “authoritarian” or “clientelistic” and tends to reproduce asymmetrical relationships.
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